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Borders are ideas erected between age groups, social classes, all
sorts of hierarchical entities, so that society may function as
predictably and as decently as possible. They are not solid brick
walls.'
This paper examines the impact of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services ("GATS") on financial services and borders. The
traditional notion of a "border" and its underlying concept of
sovereignty has been challenged over the past two decades. Borders
have become porous.' Capital movements occur freely and virtually
instantaneously between borders, as the rapid exit of capital from
Mexico and the subsequent peso collapse recently demonstrated.
Information travels unimpeded over phone lines while goods traverse
the globe in hours. A rogue trader working out of Singapore on
derivative transactions tied to the Tokyo markets can apparently bring
down an English bank that financed the wars against Napoleon
t Counsel to the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade, and Tourism. The views
expressed hereinare those of the author and in no way represent the views of the
government of Ontario.
'Nancy Huston, Beauty's Secrets, HARPER'S, Oct 1995, at 13 (excerpted from
Dealing With What's Dealt, SALMAGUNDI, Spring/Summer 1995).
2 Consider the difficulty cwrrently being experienced in keeping goods produced in the
Chinese Laogai (or prison system) from entering North America. See Alex Gillis,
Tools of the Trade ,Ts MAG., Nov., 1995, at 14.
' Barings had serious problems a century ago when they lost money speculating on
unsecured loans to Argentinean railways. See e.g., Dr. Michael Taylor, The Barings
Crisis: Some Lessons for the Management of Trading Risks in Financial
Intermediaries (1995), 3 J. FiN. REG. & COMPL. 211. The trader, Leeson, has been
[sentenced to jail] in Singapore for six and a half years AP Leeson Jailed 6 1/2 Years
in Barings Bank Crash, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 2, 1995, at A2.
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Nations within Europe, North America and South America have to
varying degrees become more integrated while map makers marvel at
the constantly shifting borders of the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. The Berlin Wall has collapsed both literally and
figuratively; the world is no longer bifurcated and capitalism has
quietly become a dominant political and economic philosophy. As the
role of government generally reduces in the Western world to address
accumulated debt and as protectionist policies like import substitution
fall away in many nations,4 the role of the state and the importance of
borders diminishes.'
The agreements creating the World Trade Organization (the
"WTO"), a restatement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT 1994") and GATS form a significant multilateral effort
to liberalize the world trading system." Canada continues to play an
active role in the on-going process to refine the WTO as one of the
so-called "quadrilateral" or "Quad" countries (along with the triad of
the U.S., E.U. and Japan). The first part of this paper focuses on the
context in which the GATS was negotiated: the market context, the
foreign policy context, the economic policy context and the
negotiating history. The second part of the paper will review GATS,
dispute resolution and the financial services protocols. Finally the
4 See, e.g., Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 MINN J. GLOBAL
TRADE 195 (1995).
' There were voices in the U.S. Congress suggesting that the WTO impinged on U.S.
sovereignty, although this political invective has been dismissed by many, including
other Congressmen, as inaccurate, see Thomas J. Dillon, Jr. The World Trade
Organization: A New Legal Orderfor World Trade?, 16 MIcH J. INT'L LAW 349, 355
(1995).
6 By the end of 1993 there were 117 signatories; 124 countries and the Commission
of the EU were formally represented at Marrakesh. One country, among many,
presently seeking membership is the People's Republic of China. Negotiations
continue, with the U.S. taking a hard line in rejecting a compromise proposal recently
floated by the E.U., Kantor Rejects EU Proposal, 43 INsiDE U.S.TRADE 1, at 21
(1995).
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paper will look at the implications of the financial services provisions
of GATS on Canadian law, with a particular focus on banking.
PART I: CONTEXT
2. TBE MARKET CONTEXT FOR GATS
The ubiquitous and irrepressible law of supply and demand no longer
respects national borders.7
The internationalization of capital markets commenced with
the development of the Eurodollar in the 1950's. The Soviet Union,
fearful that the U.S. would seize accounts in the event of hostilities,
began placing U.S. dollar accounts in Paris and London. This led to
the Eurodollar market, a phrase which came to describe any
commercial deposits outside the country of issue. In the 1970's the
fixed exchange rates devised at Bretton Woods were adjusted for U.S.
balance of payments deficits, the imbalance of payments for oil
producing companies created during the OPEC crisis were recycled
through Euromarkets and the U.S. and Germany began removing
capital controls as part of a larger financial deregulation The 1980's
and 1990's heralded new financial instruments, technological change
and a new regulatory environment for financial institutions.9
In addition to the internationalization of capital markets,
services have played an increasingly important role in the economies
of developed countries in the latter part of this century. Canada, like
7 ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY CAPrrALISM 244 (1991).
' James McCormack, Financial Market Integration: The Effects on Trade and the
Response of Trade Policy, Feb. 1994, at 11. (StaffPaper on file with the Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa, Canada, Code SP35A).
' Mary E. Footer, GATT and the MultilateralRegulation of Banking Services, 27
INT'L LAW. 343 (1993).
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many developed countries, sees its service sector contributing more
to gross domestic product and employment than any other sector.'0
Banking has become particularly important. According to one
commentator: "since the 1970's, international banking has grown at
more than 20% per annum, which is approximately twice as fast as
world trade (12%) and world output (10%)."" A survey of eleven
industrial countries and eight offshore centres revealed that almost one
third of banking assets had international characteristics."
Prior to the Uruguay Round, aside from regional trade
agreements 3 there had been no comprehensive multilateral agreement
on trade in services, although the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") established international
frameworks (referred to as "Codes") for liberalizing trade in services.
The Codes were created to "progressively abolish.., restrictions on
the movement of capital"14 and "eliminate... restrictions on current
invisible transactions and transfers."' 5 "Invisible transactions" are
service transactions, including repair and assembly, technical
assistance, author's royalties, commission and brokerage fees, profits
from business activity and so on.' 6 The OECD agreements were
limited in a number of ways: the Codes only applied to members of the
10 Bruce Stockfish & Fulvio Fracassi, International Trade in Services: A New
Frontier for Commercial Lawyers, I CDN. INT'L LAW 153 (1995).
" Footer, supra note 9, at 344.
12 UNCTAD SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, 108 (1990).
3 The North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA contains comprehensive
provisions on services. See Jeffrey Simser, Financial Services Under NA ETA: A
Starting Point (1995), 10 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 187 . The 1985 Israel-United
States Free Trade Agreement addressed services. In 1992, the Agreement establishing
the European Economic Area ("EEA") which was constituted by the European Union
and the European Free Trade Area (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria) addressed
services (The Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 1992, Luxembourg).
Finland, Sweden and Austria are now part of the EU.
"4 Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, Oct. 28, 1961, art. 1 (a), OECD,
1990.
"5 Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations, Dec. 14, 1960, art. I (a),
OECD, 1990.
16 See generally id., at Annex A.
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OECD,' the Codes lacked a dispute settlement provision with binding
arbitral powers and finally, the Codes made it easy to reserve
obligations on a number of different grounds.18 Therefore, the OECD
Codes did not provide a comprehensive or effective multilateral
agreement to liberalize trade in services.
3. THE FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT FOR GATS
It is an unfortunate, ifperhaps unavoidable, paradox of globalization
that as economies have grown more integrated, national governments
have become increasingly preoccupied with their own domestic
advantage - to the point where economic rather than military rivalry
has become the main source of international competition. '9
Conflict among nations, particularly during the Cold War
period, was often analyzed in the West by foreign policy
commentators steeped in the theory of "realism." Realism posits that
states are primary actors, "autonomous, self-interested and animated
by the single-minded pursuit of power" while operating in a Hobbesian
world "characterized by anarchy.""0 States are expected to
"7 The original members of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States pursuant to the Convention on the OECD, December 14, 1960; the
following countries became members through accession: Japan, Finland, Australia,
New Zealand and Mexico.
8 See generally, Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements supra note 14.
Reservations could be scheduled, exceptions could be found on the grounds of public
order and security, or where an economic or financial situation justifies a derogation.
19 Roy MacLaren, The Road From Marrakesh: The Quest For Economic
Internationalism in an Age ofAmbivalence, 2 Can. For. Pol. 1 (1994).
" Referring to seminal authorities such as Morgenthau. See G. Richard Shell, Trade
Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 855 (1995).
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relentlessly pursue their own self interest. Underlying "realism" is an
emphasis on sovereignty. Multilateral trade agreements appear to
undermine sovereignty to the extent that a state, either on a dejure or
de facto basis, cedes control over its ability to control its borders,
whether through tariffs, countervailing measures or even immigration
policies. The end of the Cold War has coincided with three trends
that in part call into question the analytical assumptions underlying
"realism" and in part may be responsible for the laying the
groundwork necessary to create GATS.
Firstly, state and sub-state actors have always interacted at a
multitude of different levels, but the focus of this interaction has
changed. National economies are inter-related; markets and
multinational corporations operate globally. Tourists effortlessly
frequent all comers of the globe. Fibre optic cable can connect
geographically diverse business people on the telephone or at
computer terminals without passing through a customs agent. While
not irrelevant, the state is clearly less relevant. Secondly, the fall of
communism not only ended the Cold War but also the socialist
alternative: capitalism has become the intellectual linguafranca of the
trading world. Deeply embedded in multilateral trade agreements, be
They GATS or NAFTA, is the philosophy of Adam Smith's invisible
hand, as discussed in the next section of this paper.2 Free trade
theory has, particularly for its neo-conservative proponents, an
appealing political corollary: removing barriers increases wealth at
small fiscal cost, and while reduced tariffs mean less tax revenue, there
is the appeal of less "government" (i.e. the need for bureaucrats to
2 "Economic free trade theory is essentially a positive account of how global trade
'maximize[s] real economic welfare' through 'exchange between nations based on
underlying differences of comparative advantage'." Shell, supra note 20, at 854
(quoting Benjamin J. Cohen, The Political Economy of International Trade, 44 INT'L
ORG. 261, 271 (1990); FRANKLIN R. ROOT, INTuRNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTENT
41-2 (1990). Free trade and the corresponding reduction of government protectionism
has been embraced by neo conservative ideologues as religion. Consider: "The day
may not be far off when the virus of protectionism, like smallpox, is at last
extinguished from the earth." Andrew Coyne, The 21st Century Belongs to Canada,
SAT. NIGHT MAG., Oct. 1995, at 73.
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administer complex customs regimes, subsidy regimes and so on). In
the Western hemisphere there are numerous multilateral trade
agreements 22 with others in various states of negotiationse which
' The WTO Secretariat has been notified of 108 regional economic groupings, 33 of
those within the last five years. See generally Multilateral Trade Developments, THE
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT Doc # 2267675, May 31, 1991. Some of the
agreements, such as the EU's preferential trade links with African, Pacific and
Caribbean countries are quite limited. Some like the 17 member Asia Pacific
Economic Co-operation forum are being negotiated. Others are extensive, for
example: NAFTA (the "North American Free Trade Agreement") between Canada,
the U.S. and Mexico, and the G-3 ("Group of Three") between Mexico, Columbia and
Venezuela are free trade areas. A number of other organizations have a common
market as their goal: CARICOM (the "Caribbean Community") between Antigua &
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Trinidad
& Tobago; the Andean Pact between Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and
Colombia; CACM (the "Central American Common Market") consisting of
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Panama and Belize
participate in CACM summits) and MERCOSUR (the "Southern Common Market")
between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. At the substate level there are
groupings such as PNWER (the "Pacific Northwest Economic Region") consisting
of Alaska, Alberta, British Columbia, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington. See
e.g., After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, 12 INT'L TRADE REP.
129 (1995).
' Bloc-to-bloc talks between NAFTA and the Southern Cone Common Market will
occur in February of 1996 in Buenos Aires. See generally U.S. Backs Mercosur offer
for Bloc-to-Bloc Talks before Cartagena, 13:48 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (1995). The
FTAA (the "Free Trade Area of the Americas") is currently being negotiated by
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, the U.S. and Venezuela. There are some
discussions involving the accession of Chile to NAFTA and/or to MERCOSUR. There
have also been proposals for a SAFTA or South American Free Trade Agreement. See
e.g., Denver Declaration, Work Plan Paves Steps for FTAA, 13:26 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 1 (1995). Please note that many of the articles in Inside U.S. Trade, the
International Trade Reporter and Inside NAF7"A are written without author
attribution. Canada has decided to negotiate free trade agreement with Israel and they
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reflect this free trade theory. Thirdly, state rivalries on a military scale
are less likely to be conducted through unilateral actions, particularly
by the United States. U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf, Somalia,
Bosnia and so on have all been painfully concocted as multilateral
actions under the auspices of the United Nations, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and so on. While it is difficult to draw
conclusions, it is possible to state that there is a trend towards
multilateralism.
Multilateral trade agreements are difficult to craft in a world
where states rigorously pursue self-interest with a one-way appetite
for free trade.24 A state acting in its own interests will seek to
maximize exports whilst minimizing imports; the state is exposed to
the classic "prisoner's dilemma., 25 In the prisoner's dilemma, two
prisoners are arrested, housed in separate cells and interrogated
separately. The police offer the prisoners two choices: remain silent
or confess. If one confesses and the other remains silent, the silent
prisoner is jailed whilst the confessing prisoner goes free; if they both
confess, they get a three year sentence; if they both remain silent, they
get a one year sentence. The safest choice is to confess, but both are
better off if they can trust each other enough to remain silent. In trade
relations, the safest choice is to maximize exports while minimizing
imports, but the more a state restricts imports, the more likely it will
encourage other states to limit their exports. Comparative advantage
dictates that if states can trust each other enough to stay silent, that
is not restrict imports, states will have arrived at an optimal choice.
have reached a tentative agreement. CANADA GAZETTE, Jan. 14, 1995, at 63; Canada,
IsraelReach Tentative Free Trade Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 19, 1996, at
9.
24 For a sense of the trade irritants, See, DEP'T FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT'L TRADE,
OTtAWA, REGISTER OF UNITED STATES BARRIERS To TRADE: 1995 (1995); U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATWVE 1995 NATIONAL TRADE EsTimATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS (1995); INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNcIL, JAPAN (1995).
' See, e.g., Shell, supra note 20, at 862; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Co-operation
in Long Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005 at 2022 (1987); MICHAEL J.
TRaBco C & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1995)
(who refers to the "beggar thy neighbour" approach to trade relations).
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A binding trade regime to temper the anarchy of international relations
can engender such trust.
4. THE ECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT
What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce
be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us
with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy
it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry,
employed in a way in which we have some advantage. 26
Understanding the economic theory behind trade policy is an
important tool for understanding an agreement like GATS, although
a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.' Three
economic theories purport to explain the forces governing
international trade. "Mercantilism," dominant particularly in 18th
Century Britain, viewed trade as a zero sum game: the gain of country
A was invariably at the expense of Country B. Further, the goal of a
nation was to maximize the silver and gold it could accumulate
through trade. In 1776, Adam Smith challenged the premises of
mercantilism, arguing that the goal of a nation was not to accumulate
precious metals, but rather to satisfy the consumer needs of citizens.
Smith stated that trade amongst nations was not a zero-sum enterprise
but rather an evolving source of wealth from which the most
competitive will reap the greatest reward. David Ricardo refined this
idea by introducing the notion of comparative advantage: nations
exporting that which can be produced efficiently and importing
26 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS Book IV, Ch. 2 (1776). This quotation was used in FREDERIC M. SCHERER
& RICHARD S. BELOus, UNFINISHED TASKS: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
AND THE POST-URUGUAY ROUND CHALLENGES, at 4 (1994).
27 See generally TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 25; see SCHERER & BELOUS,
supra note 26.
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everything else. For example, imagine that a lawyer can produce a
document at twice the speed of her secretary. If the lawyer's hourly
wage is $200 and the secretary's hourly wage is $20, the document is
more usefully done by the secretary (even if it takes twice as long),
freeing the lawyer to bill her services at the higher rate.28 In the trade
context, countries should concentrate on producing goods and
services where their comparative advantage is greater and import
where there is a comparative disadvantage.
A third economic theory, protectionism, has been attributed to,
among others, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Alexander Hamilton and
Friedrich List. Protectionists argue that comparative advantage and
open markets serve dominant economies at the expense of developing
economies which need time and space in which to become
competitive. Protectionism in its various iterations places national
security ahead of free trade and advocates the use of tariffs and
countervailing measures to shelter infant industry. Germany and pre-
Second World War America used tariff barriers and protectionism to
nurture infant industries. Agricultural subsidies and protectionism, rice
in Japan for example, is better understood in light of this theory.
Mexico clung to their policy of "import substitution" until the early
1980's.
Countries continue to advance arguments in favor of free trade
or protectionism depending on their relative comparative advantage.
Early in this century, two Swedish economists developed the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem which further refined our notion of
comparative advantage. The theories of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo were modified to account for the fact that even if England
produced cloth and Portugal produced wine, each with a comparative
advantage, the fact remained that Portugal might still produce cloth.
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory states that nations with an abundance of
capital will have a comparative advantage in capital intensive
industries whilst nations with an abundance of labor will have a
I Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 27, at 5.
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comparative advantage in labor intensive production. An intense
examination of this theorem by an American economist found that in
1950's America, a period where the U.S. had an abundance of capital,
Americans had a surplus in exporting labor intensive products. This
paradox came to be known as the Leontief Paradox and its discovery
led to a new school of thought known as new international trade
theory or NITT.
Proponents of NITT generally agree that comparative
advantage governs international trade flows; there is less agreement
on the forces underlying the comparative advantage of a given nation.
When the European Community was in its infancy, many expected
that nations would specialize on an industry wide basis: the Germans
in the automotive sector, the French in wine making and the Italians
in textiles. This expectation was not realized. Each country
developed a comparative advantage within specified industries: the
Germans successfully exported Volkswagen cars, Mercedes Benz
autos and their Moselles; the French exported their Citreons and
Renaults to down scale markets and their Bordeaux to upscale
markets; the Italians exported textiles, low-end Fiats and high-end
Ferraris along with their Chianti. 9 This intra-industry specialization
is one of many factors that NITT economists look to in establishing
comparative advantage. Other factors include research and
development, economies of scale and oligarchies. In addition many of
the traditional economic trade theories did not take into account the
ability of capital, services and labor to rapidly move across borders.
See generally SCHERER & BELOUS, supra note 27.
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5. SETTING THE TABLE FOR GATS
The cumbersome GA TTprocess often seemed like trench warfare, the
smaller players standing by helplessly as negotiations between the
U.S. and the E. U. ground on."0
The individuals at the Uruguay Round negotiating tables
calculated their nation's negotiating position through foreign policy
and economic analysis; the shape of their analysis created the shape of
the agreement. By the end of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the
seventh round of GATT negotiations, GATT had attained an
institutional permanence, although not to the degree envisaged under
the ill-fated International Trade Organization contemplated in the
1940's.31 Largely at the behest of the U.S. government,32 there was an
unsuccessful effort to expand GATT to include services during the
Tokyo Round. From 1979 through to 1985, the core members of
GATT strove to establish the need for, and the parameters around,
another round of negotiations. The introduction of services was a
contentious issue, particularly for unenthusiastic developing countries.
Developing countries were concerned for a number of reasons: firstly,
the trade in services issue was being addressed, at least partially, by
UNCTAD;33 secondly, there were a number of unresolved trade
issues, particularly in respect of agriculture and textiles, and
developing countries feared that their resolution would require linked
concessions in the services sector; thirdly, there was a lack of
30 COYNE, supra note 21, at 76.
3' GATT was created as a stop gap measure to kick start tariff reductions whilst the
Havana Charter was being negotiated. The ITO floundered in the U.S. Congress; in
fact Truman withdrew his request for a Senate vote on the ITO. GATT however
remained and over a number of years achieved "quasi-organizational status" largely
by default. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 5, at 354.
32 Benz, Trade Liberalisation and the Global Service Economy, 19 J. WORLD TRADE
98 (1985).
33 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. See for example:
Liberalizing International Transactions in Services: A Handbook (1994: UN & World
Bank, New York).
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knowledge and expertise in the area of services and a concomitant fear
that a multilateral agreement would "perpetuate the state of
dominance of developed countries in this sector"; finally, developing
countries feared that the GATS proposals strongly favored
comparative advantages held by developed countries (capital, know-
how and technology-intensive services) whilst paying scant attention
to issues of importance to developing countries, such as labor
intensive services.' At the same time, the United States had a surplus
of $57 billion for trade in services and a $133 billion deficit for
merchandise trade.35
During and prior to the Uruguay Round negotiations, the
United States demonstrated a tendency to invoke unilateral trade
sanctions against trading partners. Under U.S. law, any private
individual may petition the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") to inquire whether a foreign government has unfairly
blocked access to their markets. 16 If the USTR finds that the
complaint has merit and is unable through negotiations to open the
market in question, then the President has the power to take
retaliatory action, through trade sanctions for example, against that
foreign country. These "section 301" complaints particularly alarmed
' Michael Rom, Some Eay Reflections on the Uruguay RoundAgreement as seen
from the Viewpoint of a Developing Country, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5 at 23-24 (1994).
The U.S. initially proposed to bifurcate "services" into two groups: stand alone
services, like banking, which the Uruguay Round would address; and services such
as inputs for goods (construction for example) which the Uruguay Round would not
address. The proposal heavily favored developed countries and fell away from
negotiations. TREBILCOCK & HoWSE, supra note 27, at 217.
" The WTO's Agreement on Trade in Services - After the Show, T-E EcoNoMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNrr DOC # 2281588 Aug. 28, 1995 at 3.
36 "Section 301": Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-10 codified as amended at 19 US §§
2411-2421(1988). Offshoots include "Super 301"Id. §2412, "Special 301" Id. §2413
and "Telecommunications 301" Id. §§3101-3112. These sections are used in a variety
of situations and have even been considered [instead of a Chapter 20 process under
NAFTA] in the U.S. - Mexico dispute over U.S. small-package delivery firms
operating in Mexico USTR, Small-Package Firms May File NAFTA Dispute After
Failed Talks, 2:22 INSIDE NAFTA 3 (1995).
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Europeans and the existing GATT dispute structure offered little or
no protection.37 One commentator has speculated that the U.S.
actions and the international reaction to them became an important
factor in the creation of the WTO.38
The Uruguay Round began with the Punta del Este declaration
aiming for the expansion of trade, the promotion of economic growth
and the development of developing countries. The means of achieving
these aims were progressive liberalisation and transparency.
According to one commentator: "the parties compromised with
respect to policy objectives underlying the domestic regulation of
service activities."39  This compromise set the table for GATS,
particularly in heavily regulated areas like financial services.
PART II: GATS
6. GATS: THE ARCHITECTURE
The aim is to steer between the Scylla of a minimal trade position
where market access is virtually non-existent and the Charybdis of
totally unregulated trade and access with the consequence that many
national systems would be overwhelmed by large international
firms. 
4 0
" See generally Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and
Eurpoean Union Trade Law: A comparison of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1972
and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 41(1995).
Notes that over one quarter of section 301 complaints were directed at Europe.
3 See Shell, supra note 20, at 843-45. See also Gary Horlick, Dispute Resolution
Mechanism: Will the United States Play by the Rules? (1995), 2 J. WORLD TRADE
163 (1995); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Post-Uruguay Round Future of
Section 301, 25 L. POL. INT'L Bus. 1297 (1995).
3 Footer, supra note 9, at 348.
o Peter A. Vipond, The Regulation of Trade in Financial Services, 2 J. FIN. REG. &
COMPL. 248 at 249 (1994).
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GATS was created as one of several annexes to the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
Architecturally, GATS breaks down into three tiers. The first tier
contains the basic commitments and the rules of general application.
The second tier consists of horizontal and sectoral commitments
contained in annexes, protocols and Ministerial decisions. In respect
of finahcial services, there is a first and second annex, there is a first
and second protocol, and a number of decisions on Financial Services
(by the Ministers, by the Committee on Trade in Financial Services
and by the Council for Trade in Services). This mixture is largely the
result of conflict between the EU, US and Asian players. The third
tier of GATS consists of schedules of reservations; the review in this
paper of reservations will focus primarily on Canada.
The commitments under GATS are addressed at two different
levels. The basic commitment, most-favored-nation or MFN
treatment, is dealt with in the same way as principles under NAFTA
were. NAFTA employed a "negative" approach to commitments: the
agreement applied to all sectors unless a member chose to schedule an
exemption in the Annexes. A similar approach is used for MFN
treatment under GATS: unless a member schedules an exemption,
MFN applies universally. The opposite approach is adopted for other
commitments under GATS. National Treatment, for example, is only
applicable to commitments scheduled in the Annexes. So for example,
if country A does not schedule a sector under its reservations and
commitments then the presumption is that MFN applies to the sector
while National Treatment does not.
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7. GATS, THE FIRST TIER: SCOPE AND THE BASIC COMMITMENT
Services represent the largest portion of the economy in most
developed countries, and increasingly in developing countries as
well. It is the fastest growing sector of world trade.4'
Under the general provisions, GATS applies to all
governmental measures affecting trade in services. Of interest, GATS
applies to three levels of government (central, regional and local) as
well as non-governmental bodies exercising governmentally delegated
authority. In the case of some industries, the securities industry for
example, this may lead to asymmetries between nations that delegate
regulatory authority (for example, the Ontario Securities Commission)
and those that permit self-regulation (some aspects of the London
markets, for example).42 While "services" are not defined, the modes
of service supply are. These modes consist of the supply of a service:
(i) from one territory into another (this would include services
provided over the Internet or on the telephone, where the service
provider does not have to leave his or her territory);
(ii) through consumption abroad (tourism, for example);
(iii) through the establishment of a commercial presence (this
might include a Canadian company establishing a service company
subsidiary in Japan, for example); and,
(iv) through the presence of a natural person from one
territory in another territory (for example an engineer or other
professional temporarily traveling into another country to provide a
service).
Services supplied as an exercise of governmental authority,
that is not supplied on a commercial basis and not in competition with
"' Canadian Statement on Implementation, CANADA GAzETTE, Annex I, B, Dec. 3 1,
1994, at 4920.
4 See, TREBILCOCK & HoWSE, supra note 27, at 228.
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other service suppliers (policing might be an example), are excepted
from the definition of "services." The definition of services was
heavily negotiated, with many developing countries seeking a
definition limited to cross border trade; in the end an all encompassing
definition for modes of supply was arrived at.43
Most-favored-nation treatment ("MFN") found in Article II,
roughly the counterpart to Article I of GATT, is the core general
commitment under GATS. MFN requires each "Member" to "accord
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of
any other Member treatment no less favorable than it accords to like
service and service suppliers of another country."'
Just as developing countries had resisted a broad definition of
"services," developed countries resisted extending MFN to all
members. MFN is not necessarily a trade liberalizing concept. A
country wishing to close its market may do so, as long as it is
consistent with all trading partners; that same country can benefit from
open markets in other countries, which are precluded by the MFN
clause from closing their markets to the restrictive country. This "free
rider" problem complicated the GATS negotiations particularly in
respect of the financial services sector.
In GATS, unlike GATT's Article I, Members are permitted to
schedule exemptions from MFN application.45 At the time the WTO
Agreement came into force, Canada had listed two exemptions related
to financial services: firstly, licenses for establishment require
reciprocity from the applicant's home country; and secondly a Quebec
licensing preference for loan and investment companies incorporated
' Pierre Sauve, Assessing the GeneralAgreement in Trade in Services: Half-Full
or Half-Empty, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 125, 128 (1995).
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15 1994, art.II , § II. 33 ILM 1168.
The various components of the Marrakesh agreement will be referred to in the notes
as the GATS, WTO agreement, GATT 1994 and so on. "Member" is the term for
member countries used in the agreement.
Id. The Annex on Article II exemptions sets the ground rules.
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in the United Kingdom and Ireland was retained.46 "In principle",
exemptions are not to run longer than ten years and in any event are
to be negotiated in subsequent liberalizing rounds. The Council for
Trade in Services ("CTS") shall review all exemptions with a duration
of five years or more. MFN exemptions also exist for Members
wishing to confer advantages to "adjacent countries in order to
facilitate exchanges limited to contiguous frontier zones of services
that are both locally produced and consumed. ' 47 Finally, Article V
permits Members to create agreements liberalizing trade amongst
themselves (provided certain thresholds are met); for example,
concessions from Canada to Mexico under NAFTA do not have to be
extended to all Members. There is presently a dispute amongst the
Quad countries over the criteria defining regional trade agreements,
with Canada arguing that existing rules are too lax and with the EU
arguing that in the future the WTO rules should be waived to
accommodate negotiations in Eastern Europe where trade agreements
are unlikely to cover substantially all trade.48
The exemptions for MFN and the exemptions on specific
commitments discussed below have been described as "structural
weaknesses."'49 Many of the obligations are triggered by a "shopping
list" approach and GATS can only be understood by reading the
schedules both of commitments and exemptions (which run for
thousands of pages). The GATS was created after a lengthy period
of political negotiating and bargaining. The compromises necessary
to create the agreement were driven by political considerations, not
purely by technical trade issues. If the goal of GATS was to create an
' GATS, supra note 44, at schedule 16. Note the Second Protocol discussed at note
71.
17 GATS, supra note 44, at art.II, Article II, § Ill.
" Agriculture, for example, may be excluded from EU agreements with Eastern
Europe. The Quad countries are Japan, the U.S., the E.U. and Canada. Quad
Ministers Likely to Clash Over Regional Trade Pacts, 13:42 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 3
(1995).
41 Sauve, supra note 42, at 132. "Nearly all countries have taken some form of
exemption... "see Stockfish & Fricassi, supra note 10.
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all-encompassing principle-based agreement, then GATS might be
adjudged a failure. However, if GATS is viewed as a first step
towards liberalisation along the lines of the 1947 GATT, then the jury
is still out. As one commentator has suggested, the key policy feature
of GATS is "progressive liberalisation rather than a single reform,"" °
an idea enshrined in the preamble to GATS.
8. GATS, THE FIRST TIER: OTHER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
The GA TS represents an unprecedented attempt at global
liberalization and rule-making no less significant than the creation
of GA TT itself in 1947."
Part II of GATS, which begins with the MFN principle, goes
on to address a number of other principles: transparency, developing
country participation, and so on. Article III requires "transparency",
that is all members must publish or make available all measures of
general application that may impact on GATS. There are prescribed
exceptions for emergencies and disclosure of confidential information.
In a heavily regulated area like financial services, transparency
provisions are particularly important. Indeed, during the NAFTA
negotiations creating transparency, particularly in respect of Mexico,
was a primary American objective.5 2 A bank seeking to establish
operations in a foreign market must know the precise regulatory
requirements and tests for entry.
Article VI requires that domestic regulation in sectors where
specific commitments are undertaken, such as financial services, be
"administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner."
SO Vipond, supra note 40, at 25 1.
s' Petersmann, E-U, The Transformation of the World Trading System through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EJIL 161 at 200
(1995). Petersmann is the former head of GATT's office of Legal affairs.
52 See Simser, supra note 13.
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Authorizations for the supply of a service are to be adjudicated on in
a "reasonable period of time." Article VI authorizes the Council on
Trade in Services, through appropriate bodies, to establish the
disciplines necessary to ensure that licensing requirements and so on
are based on "objective and transparent criteria", are "not more
burdensome than necessary" and do not "in themselves" constitute "a
restriction on the supply of a service." " These provisions could have
a strong impact on financial services.
There are a number of other general commitments contained
in the first part of GATS. Article VIII contains disciplines on
monopoly suppliers. Article VII provides for the mutual recognition
between Members of each others' standards for licensing of service
suppliers and permits the harmonization of regulatory standards.
Subsidies and government procurement are noted as problems that
will require on-going multilateral negotiations. Finally there are a
series of prescribed exceptions, emergency safeguard measures,
measures to protect the balance of payments and so on.54
9. GATS: THE SECoND AND THIRD TIERS
... our economic security has become our national security... 
Many barriers to trade in services arise from a country's choice
of regulatory instrument, be that state monopolies, licensing or rate
setting. Removing those barriers can be a difficult political issue:
"deregulation and privatisation entail complex transitional issues and
formidable challenges of regulatory redesign."'56 Facing those
challenges and finding a politically palatable solution is one thing, it is
"3 GATS, supra note 43, Article VI.
14 See GATS, supra note 43, Articles VII and VIII.
" USTR Mickey Kantor paraphrasing President Clinton: Kantor, M. U.S. Policy in
Transition: Globalization in a New Age, 25 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 1227 at 1227
(1995).
56 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 27, at 226.
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quite another to agree to an agenda of change mandated by a
multilateral agreement. Countries were not willing to commit
absolutely to the wholesale removal of barriers under GATS.
Countries felt they needed the flexibility to find their own solutions to
their own problems in their own time. For this reason, we see
reservations and concrete commitments scheduled rather than the
principled approach of other agreements like NAFTA.
Part III of GATS is entitled "Specific Commitments." Article
XVI reaffirms MFN treatment to scheduled commitments. A footnote
adds that where there is a commitment on a service and where the
cross border movement of capital is an essential part of that service,
then the Member is committed to allowing that movement of capital.
If a market access commitment is made, that Member cannot impose
limitations on the number of suppliers, the value of their service
transactions or on the participation of foreign capital. Article XVII
provides that where a scheduled commitment on national treatment
exists, "each member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
another Member, in respect of measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers."57 A footnote to the section states that
providing national treatment does not entail making up for any
inherent competitive disadvantages that a foreign supplier may have.
However, the article goes on to mandate substantive national
treatment, even if that entails formally different treatment. Article
XVIII permits Members to negotiate further commitments.
Part IV of GATS is entitled "Progressive Liberalisation."
While a detailed analysis of this section is beyond the scope of this
' Canada has scheduled a number of national treatment exceptions, under horizontal
commitments, to cross border consumption (for example tax measures for research
and development expenses) but no limitations on market access. Under Sectoral
commitments Canada has, for example, placed both national treatment and market
access limitations on auditing (primarily related to accreditation and residency).
Canada Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/l 6 page I and 18.
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paper, a few things are worth noting. The purpose of GATS, as with
GATT in 1947, is to create and encourage the process of
liberalisation. In order to achieve this, there are not only facilitative
provisions but also provisions to prevent "backsliding." To the extent
that GATS preserves the status quo, there will be a stable and
predictable market for entrepreneurs and investors.
10. GATS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE NEGOTIATIONS
Throughout much of the post-war period, the multilateral trading
system was rightly seen as a bulwark against a return to the trade
chaos of the 1930's. Today, the threat posed by a loss of credibility
of the multilateral rules and disciplines would not be a return to the
1930's... but rather afracturing of the global economy into inward
looking and potentially antagonistic trading blocks. "
The GATS in respect of financial services is currently
incomplete as a result of the position taken by the Americans;5 9 this
section shall briefly review some of the negotiating history behind the
current state of affairs. When the Uruguay Round ended in December
of 1993, there were a number of important issues unresolved,
including financial services. A protocol was agreed to whereby
members would have until June of this year to try and resolve the
outstanding matters. Americans were dissatisfied with the positions
58 Renate Ruggiero, Director General of the WTO, speaking on regional trade blocks:
Ruggerio Calls for Strong W!O, 13:46 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 11 (1995).
59 The U.S. position will be discussed in detail below. The U.S. politics surrounding
international agreements is complicated by mandate of the U.S. Constitution: Article
II, § 2, cl.2 empowers the President to conduct foreign affairs while Article I, § 8, cl.3
empowers Congress to regulate trade with other nations. The "fast track" procedure
createdunder the TradeAct of 1974, §§ 151-54, 19 USC §§ 1291-94(1988& Supp
1993) precludes Congressional amendments to a treaty and ensure action by the House
of Representatives and the Senate within a proscribed period. There is a House GOP
proposal to amend the existing fast track legislation entitled the Trade Authority Act
of 1995 which at the time of writing had not been passed into law.
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tabled by a number of developed countries (notably Japan) and a
number of developing countries, particularly in Asia and South
America (notably India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brazil). American
negotiators feared extending MFN status and creating a free rider
problem with a number of states which had threatened to completely
close their markets to U.S. access. Ironically, at the time of writing
America appears to be (but in fact isn't)' a free rider having reserved
on financial services while having access to concessions negotiated
principally between the EU and a number of Asian trading partners.
The Americans, while negotiating on GATS, set out to open
markets through bilateral agreements. In January of this year, an
agreement was reached with Japan61 that opened up Japanese markets,
particularly in respect of mutual funds and the insurance industry. The
market for foreign investment advisory firms was expanded from 25%
to 61% of the Japanese financial market. Rules requiring that mutual
60 Through mid-1994, some 300foreign banks operated nearly 600 branches and
agencies in the US.A.. American affiliates offoreign banks accounted for one-fifth
of U.S. banking assets. Washington has assured its major trade partners that they
would retain all existing access levels and not face new restrictions. The WTO's
Agreement see Note 35 above, at p.3. As a practical matter, the U.S. won't wield
the exemption because foreign countries here have constitutional guarantees to be
operating here. G. Henry of the American Insurance Association quoted in Banham,
R, Reactions Mixed to WfIO Deal (Dec.7, 1995) J. OF COMMERCE 19 (Dec.7, 1995).
61 Japan-U.S. Measures Regarding Financial Services, 34 ILM 617 (1995). There
have been allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency was used by the Clinton
Administration and the USTR Mickey Kantor to provide advance information during
trade negotiations. In a press conference, Kantor stated that the Clinton Administration
does not discuss the intelligence community at all. Japan has formally protested to
Washington. A. Mitchell Newsreport (October 18, 1995), NBC Nightly News,
Washington. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Winston Lord, would only tell the
Japanese ambassador to the United States that the U.S. State Department never
comments on intelligence matters and refused to confirm or deny the reports. Japanese
Ambassador Says Spying Reports Lead to Distrust of U.S.,, 13:44 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 12 (1995). Canada has been accused of spying on Mexico during trade talks
by former Communications Security Establishment agent S. Lorten. Diebel, L. Mexico
Expresses WorryAt Spy Claims (Nov.14, 1995) ToRoNTo STAR Al 3.
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funds only be sold by Japanese firms were lifted as were restrictions
respecting Euro-Yen issues, a domestic asset-backed securities market
and the offshore securitization of Japanese assets. Changes to market
access and transparency provisions are expected to open up the
Japanese insurance market by as much as $1 billion in additional
premiums.'
11. GATS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE RESULTS TO DATE
Naturally with one major trading partner unable to improve the
commitments it made in 1993 or to offer non-discriminatory access
to its market, this must be a second-best result. But it is a very good
second best. 63
The provisions of GATS respecting financial services can only
be determined by looking in a variety of places: GATS itself, the
various schedules to GATS, two annexes, two protocols, a Ministerial
decision and decisions of the Council for Trade in Services as well as
the Committee on Trade in Financial Services. This fragmented
structure is the result of the muddled and only partially resolved
negotiation process described in the previous section of this paper. By
the end of the Uruguay Round, 76 countries had scheduled
commitments on financial services; some nations, notably the U.S.,
felt that those scheduled commitments were insufficient. The First
Protocol to GATS created a six month extension for further
negotiations. In July of 1995, an agreement (without U.S.
endorsement) was reached that created some level of multilateral
commitment and further extended the time for negotiation into the fall
of 1997. This section of the paper will review the protocols, annexes
and decisions respecting financial services under GATS.
62 West Revs Up for Access to $600bn Market, Economist Intelligence Unit,
document # 223084 (March 1, 1995).
' Renate Ruggiero, Director-General of the WTO: WTO Press Release #18, July 26,
1995, Geneva p. 1.
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The First Annex of GATS defined financial services broadly to
include:
(i) insurance and related services, including reinsurance,
retrocession, and intermediation such as brokerage and agency work;
(ii) banking and other financial services, including deposit
taking, lending, guarantees, leasing, certain trading activities
(including on derivatives) and other forms of intermediation. "
The First Annex brings financial services into the GATS
definition of trade in services.65  Services conducted by a
governmental authority, including central bank functions, statutory
schemes for social security and retirement funds, and other
government activities are excluded from the definition of services
provided that such government does not permit private sector
competition in the relevant area.' Members are permitted to retain a
"prudential carve-out." That is, measures created for prudential
reasons such as the protection of either depositors or financial system
integrity are permitted so long as such measures are not designed to
defeat the commitments under GATS.67 As with NAFTA, the
prudential carve-out may have important implications: it will be the
basis to defend virtually all actions in the financial services sector that
are the subject of a dispute.
The financial services provisions of GATS are best understood
as a road map of intentions rather than as a statement of
commitments. While face-saving specific commitments provide some
level of firm multilateral commitment as discussed below, the main
focus of the financial services provisions are the identification of areas
Annex on Financial Services, s.5. 1.
65 Annex on Financial Services, s. 1.1; GATS Art. 1 (2).
66 Central Bank functions are excluded from the exemption. Annex on Financial
Services, ss. 1.2 and 1.3; GATS Art I 3(b).
6 Annex on Financial Services, s. 2. 1. Section 2.2 protects Members who withhold
information to comply with their banking secrecy laws.
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where further liberalisation is desirable. For example, the First Annex
provides for the future harmonization of regulatory regimes
respecting prudential measures through mutual recognition.6 Where
harmonization exists, for example under the Basel Accord,69 accession
by other Members with similar regulatory and oversight regimes is to
be encouraged. Where harmonization measures are being
contemplated, the negotiating Members do not have to notify the
Council on Trade in Services under paragraph 4(b) of Article VII of
GATS, a section designed to broaden liberalisation efforts generally.
The so-called "First Protocol" furthered the process by
recognizing and accommodating the need for further negotiations. The
First Protocol approach to specific commitments differs from the
approach mandated by Part III of GATS (which addressed market
access, national treatment and other commitments). The First
Protocol is heavily qualified: negotiations can take their course so
long as they do not conflict with GATS; Members are still free to
schedule specific commitments; any specific commitments negotiated
were to be extended on an IFN basis; no presumptions were made
about the extent to which any Member was willing to liberalise trade
in financial services; and finally, limitations and qualifications were
limited to non-conforming measures.7" Each Member agreed to
schedule monopolies in the financial services sector and to endeavour
to reduce or eliminate those monopolies. Public entities purchasing
financial services were to extend National Treatment and MFN status
to non-Member financial institutions established in the country of
consumption. Cross-border trade is addressed on two levels. Non-
8 Annex on Financial Services, s.3.
6 The Cooke Committee guidelines for capital adequacy of regulated banks were
negotiated under the auspices of the Bank for mational Settlements in Basel:
International Monetaiy Fund (Exchange and Trade Relations Research Departments)
International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects (Washington: IMF,
1989).
70 Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services (the "First Protocol")
preamble.
1996]
59 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 3
residents may, as a principal through an intermediary, provide services
accorded national treatment for: insurance risks relating to maritime
shipping, commercial aviation and goods in international transit;
reinsurance and retrocession; and the provision of financial
information and financial services data processing. Secondly,
residents may make cross border purchases of the insurance services
noted above as well as banking services generally. The First Protocol
also contains provisions relating to the processing of information and
the entry of personal.
The First Protocol also addresses some of the general issues:
the road map for negotiations. The right of establishment, subject to
any regulatory requirements that do not conflict with GATS, is to be
extended to financial institutions of all Members.7 Financial service
providers established in the territory of another Member are permitted
to offer new financial services.72 All Members endeavour to remove
or limit the adverse effects of measures, including non-discriminatory
measures, that inhibit the ability of non-Member financial service
providers to compete and
expand into the territory of another Member.73 Finally national
treatment is to apply to payment and clearing systems, self-regulating
organizations such as stock exchanges and official funding and
refinancing facilities (although not lenders of last resort).74
In June and July of 1995 a flurry of negotiations resulted in a
partial resolution of issues with 29 countries, 75 including the EU,
11 Id., ss. 5-6
7 Id.,s.7.
7 Id., s. 10 (excludes measures that would discriminate against a financial service
provided for the Member making such changes).
71 Id., National Treatment sections 1 and 2.
7' The 29 counties signing the protocol were: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the
Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, the European Union, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Norway, Pakistan, Phillipines, Poland, Singapore, The Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. Three countries not signing the
protocol but making some concessions: Columbia, Mauritius and the United States.
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Canada and Japan, signing the "Second Protocol" with a schedule of
various commitments coming into effect on August 1, 1996. Three
countries, including the United States, elected not to sign the Second
Protocol but did agree to make unilateral commitments. The Council
for Trade in Services adopted the Second Protocol in a decision which
also permitted Members to revisit their scheduled commitments for a
two month period commencing on November 1, 1997 should further
negotiations prove unsuccessful.76 The Americans did not improve
their 1993 position nor offer unfettered market access. Despite
intensive diplomatic attempts, particularly by the EU, the U.S. felt that
more progress could be made through bilateral negotiations; the
Americans had been successful with Japan7" and hoped to repeat that
success elsewhere. The U.S. negotiators were particularly chagrined
by Indonesia's offer, which was worse than their present practise.
78
The commitments of the 29 countries who signed the Second Protocol
vary from country to country and it is difficult to generalize the
results. Generally, restrictions on establishment and cross border
provision of financial services were reduced, licenses for foreign
institutions were increased, nationality requirements for boards of
directors were softened and foreign institutions were granted better
access to payment and clearing systems. Of the signatories, 19
countries are improving their access for insurance companies, 23
countries are improving the status of foreign banks and 14 countries
are lifting some of the restrictions on foreign insurance companies.
WTO Unofficial Summary of Negotiations (28 August 1995: WTO, Geneva).
76 The Second Protocol to the GATS was issued on July 24, 1995; the Committee on
Trade in Financial Services issued a decision to accommodate the Second Protocol on
July 21, 1995; on that same date, two decisions of the Council for Trade in Services
solidified the timing details.
" Japan-U.S.: Measures Regarding Financial Services (1995), 34 ILM 617. Japan
agreed to extend these commitments multilaterally to accommodate the Second
Protocol.
78 American insurance companies currently doing business in the [Indonesian]
insurance market would not have been assured that their current rights would be
protected. See The WTO , supra note 35, at 2.
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12. THE IMPACT OF GATS ON THE BANK ACT
In the borderless world, it is harder every day to see where national
interests lie.79
The primary change to the Bank Act resulting from the WTO
Agreement can be found in the repeal of the "10/25" rules. The
"10/25" rules prohibited issues or transfers of shares in a bank "to a
non-resident or any entity that is controlled by a non-resident" if as a
result such non-resident would acquire a "significant" interest (greater
than 10%) in "any class of shares of a bank." Such issues and
transfers were also prohibited where the non-resident would hold
more than 25% of the voting rights attached to all shares.8" Under
NAFTA, Mexican and U.S. residents were exempted from these
rules.81 Now the rules have been repealed altogether.82 Of interest,
the beneficiaries of this repeal are not limited to WTO members nor
to signatories of the Second Protocol. The restrictions on significant
interests in Schedule I banks has been retained' and Schedule II banks
have a ten year grace period in which to become broadly held.84 One
other significant amendment was made to the Bank Act: the power
of the Minister to limit domestic assets of non-NAFTA bank
subsidiaries to 12% of total domestic bank assets has been repealed.85
13. THE WTO DisPum SETTLEMENT BODY
19 OHMAE, K THE BORDERLESS WORLD 182 (1990).
80 Bank Act, ch. 46, 1991 S.C. 1317 (Can.).
81 North American Free Trade Implementation Act, ch.44, 1993 S.C. 1931 (Can.).
2 World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, ch.47, 1994 S.C. 19
(Can.). The sections of the Bank Act consequentially affected are §§ 39(1)(c),
39(2)(c), 160, 231 (1)(c), 231 (2)(c), 378.1, 396.1, 397, 407 and 508.
8 Bank Act, ch. 46, §372, 1991 S.C. 1300 (Can.).
Id. §373, amended by ch.47, § 17, 1994 S.C. 6 (Can.).
85 Id. §422.3 amended by North American Free Trade Implementation Act, ch.44,
§28, 1993 S.C. 1932 (Can.); repealed by WTOAIA, ch.47, §25, 1994 S.C. 8.
GA TS. REDEFINING BORDERS
Nevertheless, some officials predicted that every WTO panel ruling
will be appealed Appeals will be necessary for every country which
losses a panel to convince its domestic interests that the government
has done all it can in a dispute, one WTO official said. "
The name for the WTO was not established until shortly before
the Marrakesh signing ceremony. At the conclusion of the negotiating
rounds, the organization was to be called the Multilateral Trade
Organization. The Clinton Administration apparently felt that "World"
had more sloganeering appeal than "Multilateral" and negotiated the
last minute name change.87 Thus was born the WTO. While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to examine the WTO dispute
settlement body ("DSB") in detail, its basic features are worth noting.
The dispute resolution process is the culmination of
compromises between political, economic and social interests as
well as "an elaboration on the experience gained under... (GATT)
over four decades."88 The process has three main features. First, there
is a unified dispute system with one organization and one set of
procedural rules. Second, there is a panel of first instance (formed
after no consensus agreement can be reached) and more importantly,
an appellate body.89 Third, decisions rendered by this process will
"automatically come into force as a matter of international law in
virtually every case."" Under the old GATT system, an adversely
affected party could veto any unfavourable decision. In its history only
SWTO Approves Seven Members ofAppellate Body Despite EU Objections (1995),
13:48 INsIDE U.S.TRADE 7.
8 Scherer, supra note 27, at p. ix.
Palitha T.B. Kohona, Dispute Resolution under the World Trade Organization:
An Overview, J. WORLD TRADE, APRIL 1994 at 23, 23.
9 See supra note 82; see also Dillon, supra note 5, at 373.
90 Shell, supra note 20, at 832 (quoting John H. Jackson, "Managing the World
Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATTAgenda," in MANAGING
THE WORLD ECONOMY 131, 141 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994)).
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one GATT decision was not vetoed.91 Now the process has been
inverted in favour of legalism: all Members, including the one bringing
the complaint, must agree to veto a decision. The Americans, perhaps
concerned with this legalism, are working on domestic legislation (at
the behest of Congress with the approval of the Clinton
Administration) that would establish a panel ofjudges to review any
WTO decisions; at the time of writing, the legislation has not passed.'
There are a few cases presently before or on their way to the
dispute settlement process. The Americans and Canadians are
pressing for a review of the EU implementation of GATT 1994 in
respect of grains.' As part of a long running dispute over EU import
restrictions on bananas, the U.S. is charging that in addition to GATT
violations, license restrictions preventing or limiting the ability of
certain suppliers to market their product in Europe discriminate in
violation of GATS.94 The U.S., E.U. and Canada have asked for a
panel to review Japanese liquor taxes (GATT ruled against Japan in
1987 but apparently the complainants are unhappy with Japan's
implementation)." The first WTO ruling, on a challenge by Brazil and
Venezuela of U.S. regulations on gasoline, is expected in January of
1996.96
14. CoNCLusioNS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
9' Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Basic
Instruments & Selected Documents, Article XXIII, Supp. 32 (Nov. 8, 1952).
WTO Review Commission Bill, 13:33 INSmE U.S. TRADE 9 (1995).
9 "The main complaint is that the EU is assessing tariffs based on a reference price
system, rather than on actual invoice prices on individual shipments." U.S., Canada
to Askfor WTO Panel, 13:40 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 3 (1995).
"' U.S. Cites Services Deal in Potential Challenge of EU Banana Regime, 13:40
Inside US Trade 10 (1995).
SU.S., Canada, E.U, Request WTO Panel in Dispute on Japan Liquor Tax,, 13:38
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (1995).
' See supra note 82.
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We [the EU and US] agree to concert our efforts to promote
liberalisation of financial services on a worldwide basis. In
particular, we will seek to ensure that the interim agreement
concluded in July of 1995 is succeeded by a more substantial
package of permanent liberalisation commitments from a critical
mass of WTO members. 9'
The leaked agenda of a meeting in late October of 1995
between the Quad countries (Canada, Japan, the EU, and the U.S.),
reveals some of the issues that will have to be resolved in the short
and long-term future. There is concern about the direction that the
next Ministerial meeting, set for Singapore in 1996, should take. For
example, will the goal of that meeting be a procedural outcome (that
is the establishment of effective working groups to explore new
issues) or a concrete outcome? There are a number of areas that a
concrete outcome could address: finalizing the financial services
provisions with U.S. participation; there are presently 108 regional
economic groupings" but little direction on how they strengthen or
weaken the multilateral trading system administered by the WTO; the
accession of China to the WTO is still contentious, in part because it
will set a precedent for other countries seeking to accede; the U.S.,
amongst others, has complained about the overburdened dispute
settlement process and the duplication of effort among many of the
WTO councils; finally, at present the chairmen of the various WTO
councils are not "empowered to pursue a steering role", a task
presently undertaken by an informal group of Geneva ambassadors,
and there is a need for a formal structure put in place to do that job."
Chile is the focus of attention, at least in the Western
Hemisphere. Chile may accede to NAFTA if Congress provides the
"' EU-US Draft Action Plan, leaked on December 1, 1995: US-EU Action Plan
(1995), 13:48 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1 at 18.
9 See supra note 22.
" The October 20, 1995 meeting was held in Yorkshire England and the agenda was
leaked to a specialty trade journal. QuadMinisters Likely to Clash Over Regional
Trade Talks (1995), 13:42 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 3.
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Clinton administration with fast-track negotiating authority, although
there is sensitivity regarding labour and environmental issues. If Chile
does not accede, they may well consummate their negotiations with
the Southern Cone Common Market and open up bilateral talks with
Canada."° In terms of financial services, the Chilean regulatory
regime will have to change to accommodate NAFTA. Presently there
is a one year waiting period for the repatriation of capital, laws
restricting branching and income tax laws which discriminate against
non-Chilean banks.1"'
GATS is an important first step in the effort to liberalise trade
on a multilateral basis. The agreement itself has architectural
weaknesses, particularly in respect of the scheduling approach. The
agreement is not without its strengths however. There is a mandated
process to encourage further discussion. There is a binding dispute
resolution process. In respect of financial services there are many
difficult negotiations ahead. During the talks leading to the Second
Protocol, certain developing countries (notably Pakistan, India and
Brazil) sought a linkage between financial services talks and the right
of movement for natural people. That linkage demand was dropped
after a two way compromise: the EU reportedly agreed to lift certain
immigration restrictions on temporary entry and the U.S. reportedly
agreed to allowing parallel talks on the issue.0 2 Such is the nature of
a multilateral trade agreement. Even with the work to be done, and
in light of our ever evolving global economy and our shifting concept
of borders, GATS may be the best possible achievement for the
moment.
" Comments of Chile's lead NAFTA negotiator, Juan Gabriel Valdes, made in New
York on October 10th. Canada has a considerable amount of investment in Chile,
hence the desire for bilateral talks. Without Fast Track; Chile May Pursue Bilateral
(1995), 2:22 INSIDE NAFTA 1.
01 U.S. Must Press Chile, 2:18 INSIDE NAFTA3 (1995).
12 See supra note 35.

